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"Asians don't play dominoes," a Southeast Asian Prime Minister commented
in April 1975, when he was asked how the abrupt collapse of former President
Thieu's regime in what was South Vietnam might affect the region as a whole.
His statement is less facetious than it might at first seem. It has a direct
bearing on the possible configuration of relationships -- still developing --
in Southeast Asia after the scurried end of American intervention in Indo-China,
and the emergence of a unified Vietnam as a potential centre of influence in
the region. The Prime Minister's comment betokens a conviction that the
non-communist states of Southeast Asia, freed from the distortions and complications
of direct Western participation in the region's diplomacy, are capable of building
a new structure of linkages.
The occupation of former President Thieu's palace in Saigon (now Ho Chi
Minh city) by an advance party of North Vietnamese troops on April 30, 1975
marked the end of 117 years (from 1858) of direct foreign involvement and
influence in the affairs of Indo-China. The last phase of that period was
a tragic story of American entrapment in a situation that required not only
a major and complex commitment in Indo-China itself, but also a series of
supportive activities in surrounding areas. For Indo-China, says a post-war
study, April 1975 and the trends leading up to and beyond the events of that
month meant that "direct foreign interference was abruptly and utterly
liquidated, and the three Indo-Chinese states (were) in a position not only
to live in peace and independence but also to speak for themselves." The
obligation to "speak for themselves" was thrust on Indo-China's non-communist
neighbours as well.
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With the winding down of a range of operations in Southeast Asia that
had been a conconlilitant of America's intervention in Vietnam since 1954, it
was clear that the US could no longer be counted on as an ubiquitous ally.
Some non-communist states had gnawing doubts about whether the US could
even be considered a reliable friend. Britain, France, and Holland, the
three other Western nations that exercised power in the region before, had
withdrawn earlier. In and after April 1975, therefore, the non-comunist
states of Southeast Asia had to reconsider their options in very short order,
grappling with a situation that seemed to cause anger or anguish or both in
Southeast Asian capitals. (This paper does not cover Burma, whose reclusive
style rules out informed analysis.)
Twenty-one years earlier, in 1954, President Eisenhower introduced the
game of dominoes into the vocabulary of international politics, when he told
a Washington press conference: "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock
over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that it will go
over very quickly." In the weeks preceding April 1975, the "dominoes" seemed
to fear for their own survival. News reports recording the rapid collapse
of Saigon's forces sent shock-waves through the capitals of neighbouring
countries, causing a mood bordering on panic.
Perhaps in the future, some Southeast Asian leader, impressed by the
potential profits of catharsis in public, and abetted by a latter-day
David Frost, will tell us the fascinating story of how that panic was
subdued in a hectic series of diplomatic exchanges involving a variety of
proposals for "coming tO terms" with the "new" Indo-China. That will have
to wait.
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For the present, however, we know that if "Asians don't play dominoes,"
they do play chess. Non-coninunist Southeast Asia's opening gambit in a
diplomatic "game" that seems likely to be long and arduous was a declaration
on May 14, 1975 in which the foreign ministers of ASEAN states (the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations) "expressed their readiness to enter
into a friendly and harmonious relationship with each nation in Indo-China,"
and "reiterated their willingness to co-operate with those countries in the
common tasks of national development.'t
Bygones should properly remain bygones, the foreign ministers seemed
to be saying. It did not matter that their countries had overtly or covertly
supported American policy in Vietnam at one time or another; that Thailand,
for instance, was described as a "landlocked aircraft carrier" of the US
Indo-China Coniiiand; that some non-corrniunist states of Southeast Asia had
been secondary beneficiaries of the American military effort (as suppliers,
buyers, providers of Rest and Recreation, and so on); that at the United
Nations they had endorsed the validity of Gen. Lon Nol's rule in Cambodia.
They were, above all, fellow Southeast Asians. Surely, they need not play
dominoes?
This "sweetly reasonable" approach has to be balanced against another
compulsion in Southeast Asian politics; what established authority in the
regions calls the Coninunist Threat - a fear of subversion and/or attack by
cornunist agents, forces, or whatever. As a Southeast Asian Defence Minister
with a flair for picturesque patter once put it "Communism is like hoof
and mouth disease. It is always a potential threat...everywhere." The most
readily perceived threat, of course, is from domestic insurgents, terrorists,
guerillas, or freedom fighters; one can describe them in terms of one's own
persuasion, but there is no doubt at all about the perspective in which the
governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
see them.
It is reasonable to suppose that the communist victory in Vietnam -
both the event, and the manner in which it came about - would have buoyed
insurgents in the rest of Southeast Asia. Notebooks picked up in insurgent
strongholds during Operation Big Star, the recent Thai-Malaysian counter-
insurgency operation, described events in Vietnam as a situation that should
"inspire" Southeast Asian insurgents to work harder at achieving their goals.
Beyond the psychological factor, however, there is the fear that a victorious
and militant Vietnam, strengthened by the acquisition of American arms, would
supply and perhaps fight side-by-side with insurgent groups in the so-called
domino countries. Vietnamese military writings refer to the importance of
a "friendly hinterland" and "reliable rear areas." Would Southeast Asian
insurgents be supplied from "reliable rear areas?" Or, as Tun Abdul Razak put it
with charming delicacy, would Vietnam's military supplies "fall into the hands
of smugglers who could sell them to lawless elements in neighbouring countries?"
Thai intelligence officials claim that Vietnamese weapons have already
reached as far south as to units of the Liberation Army of Thailand on the
Southern Front, in Surat Thani province. rn February 1976 a member of
Thailand's National Security Council said that a combined Thai/Vietnamese
sapper unit trained in Vietnam was engaged in sabotage at government installations.
Generals, policemen and bureaucrats in Southeast Asia do not as a rule
make pronouncements of this kind independently and unilaterally. Theirs is
the overt expression of the political premise that Vietnamese support to
local insurgents could decisively influence politics in non-comunist
Southeast Asia, and thereby alter the region's political and military balance.
To be sure, much the same suspicion has been directed against China and the
Soviet Union. Some of Southeast Asia's insurgent groups have set themselves
up in China; others have taken sides in the schismatic dispute between China
and the Soviet Union. Vietnam, however, is closer. Japan's raid on Kota Baru
in Malaysia, which preceded the Japanese occupation of then Malaya and Singapore,
was accomplished by bombers that took off from an airbase in Southern Vietnam.
The strength of the Vietnamese People's Army, Vietnam's support for its allies
in Cambodia and Laos during the events leading up to changes of regime there,
and ancient rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam, tend to heighten suspicion
and fear. Furthermore, there is also a fairly widespread belief in Southeast
Asia that the leaders of a revolutionary movement are likely to be militant
in their external relations in the period iniiiediately following domestic
success; that tirrie cools revolutionary ardour.
The People's Army of Vietnam is a formidable organization: ideologically
inspired, well trained and disciplined, tested in battle, heirs to a tradition
that has tasted more victory than defeat. At the time of the fall of the
Thieu Government in 1975, North Vietnam's military strength stood at 700,000
consisting of a 685,000-strong army, a 3,000-man navy, and an airforce of
12,000 This compares with a combined military manpower of 628,000 in the five
ASEAN states. The comparison does not, in fact, give a true picture of military
imbalance because there is no such thing as an ASEAN force. The 628,000
servicemen in ASEAN countries are under national commands and, despite some
instances of bilaterial security co-operation, have no training as, or
orientation toward, unified operations.
Vietnamese armed forces have been slightly expanded by the recruitment of
officers and men from the old Saigon army. More important, the People's Army
unexpectedly received a bonanza of material from their erstwhile adversaries.
The weaponry handed over or just left behind by Southern forces in 1975 included
550 tanks, 12,000 mortars, 47,000 grenade launchers, 1,648,580 rifles, 940 ships,
over 200 fighters and fighter bombers, 466 helicopters, 42,000 trucks, and 130,000
tons of ammunition. This arsenal has been valued at between $2 and $4 billion.
Some 40 to 50 percent of it is considered fully serviceable, although Vietnamese
troops are not all familiar with the use of American weapons. Shells for some
of the mortars could be obtained from China, which makes replicas. Nor has
there been post-war demobilization in Vietnam. On the contrary, the Politbureau
in Hanoi has called for "a stronger and more modern army."
Almost 20 years ago Ho Chi Minh insisted that the armed forces, while
defending the motherland "must actively participate in production, and
contribute to economic construction." He was said to be emphasizing a
historical tradition: Ancient Vietnamese dynasties are said to have deployed
their troops in the countryside where they engaged in farming and construction,
in addition to fulfilling their military obligations. According to recent
reports from Vietnam, something of the same pattern is being followed by the
People's Army today The army rebuilt part of the old Hanoi-Saigon rail link,
and has been working in mines and at building sites. This ennobling example
of an armed service actually turning from guns to pick axes, if not ploughshares,
might have served to put the rest of Southeast Asia at ease but for the
nagging suspicion that a communist government with an impressive military
establishment at its disposal, and with its revolutionary zeal very much
alive, would feel an obligation to place its experience and resources at
the disposal of neighbouring revolutionary movements.
Lenin defined the international obligations of the communist movement
unequivocally. He said: "There is only one way of being a genuine interna-
tionalist; to strain all our energies in an endeavour to develop the revolutionary
struggle in our own land; to support that struggle in every way, by propaganda,
sympathy, material aid; and support only that struggle in every country without
exception. Everything else is a snare and a delusion." Theoreticians of the
Chinese Communist Party followed this line, emphasizing that "the preletariat
in the socialist countries, with the assistance of the world preletariat and
the working masses of oppressed nations, defend the fruits of victory which
the proletarian revolution has already achieved, and, at the same time, supports
the continuous advance of proletarian revolution in other countries, continuously
diminishing the strength of imperialism until capitalism has perished and
socialism has triumphed throughout the world."
Theory is often leavened by day-to-day realities, however. A country's
perception of its national priorities and interests, and the strategy it chooses
for the furtherance of those concerns and interests, may have a greater influence
than ideology on the conduct of its external relations. Vietnam's domestic
concerns are centred on recovery from the blows of war, and the creation of a
new political and economic order throughout the country. The dimensions of
that task are so great, that it will require a total mobilization of domestic
resources. Moreover, there are very clear indications that Vietnam does not
believe these tasks can be accomplished in isolation.
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The US National Academy of Sciences estimates that Agent Orange, a
defoliant sprayed over Vietnam by US forces, destroyed 36 percent of the
country's coastal mangrove forests, and extensively damaged inland forests.
Some damage might take a century to restore, the Academy's study said. A
UN mission led by Walter Umbricht of the IRC toured Vietnam last year, and
reported that 183 dams, and 884 irrigations works in the North had been bombed
during the war, and over 350 kms of railway track destroyed. In the South,
the report said, one million hectares of arable land had been abandoned.
One in every 20 people suffered from venereal disease; one in every 20 was
a drug addict. The report coninented: "In view of the magnitude of the disaster
it is obvious that the work of national reconstruction far surpasses the human
and material possibilities of the Vietnamese people." That is reality. So
is post-war crop failure, caused by poor weather.
The UN mission recommended that Vietnam should give priority to the
development of the agricultural sector, including clearing new land, and
restoring abandoned land to use; and to the reconstruction of communications.
These priorities have been written into Vietnam's current (1976/80) Five Year
Plan. The Plan calls for an 18 percent increase of Gross National Product
in 1977; with agriculture growing by 16 percent. Land reclamation improved
irrigation, greater use of high yielding varieties of rice, intercropping and
mechanization are all part of planned agricultural activity. The 1977 target for
rice production is 14 million tons, from 12 million tons in 1976. Some 270,000
hectares of land are to be reclaimed. The afforestation target is 200,000
hectares. The Plan also covers industry, transport, communication, and trade
expansion. The current emphasis on reconstruction could be seen, too, when
the Political Report presented to the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party
of Vietnam in December 1976 stressed "scientific and technical revolution" as
much as it did political revolution.
War-ravaged Vietnam cannot afford extra-territorial diversions while
undertaking national reconstruction. Moreover, aid agencies from which
Vietnam seeks assistance are unlikely to loosen their purse strings unless
they are convinced that Vietnam is, in fact, more serious about reconstruction
than about revolutionary obligations abroad. Vietnam has sought and received
IMF financing. It has also sought World Bank aid, and two World Bank teams
have so far visited Vietnam. The new government has also approached the
Asian Development Bank with an offer to take over the $5 million debt of the
Thieu regime if the ADB will release the $39 million promised before April
1975 but not disbursed. These loans, if they are forthcoming, would be spent
on a hydro-electricity project near Ho Chi Minh City, expanding the electric
power system generally, developing coal mines, a railway, equipment factory,
and assorted farming and fishing programs. Vietnam has also invited private
foreign investment.
In the context of these priorities, it is not surprising that a report on
The Fundamental Concept of our Foreign Policy, endorsed by the National Assembly
in June last year, held out the hand of friendship to all countries. The report
said that Vietnam was "ready to establish and develop relations of friendship and
co-operation with other countries in Southeast Asia on the basis of respect for
each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit,
and peaceful co-existence." The report also expressed Vietnam's desire "to
establish and expand normal relations between our country and all countries with
different social systems, on the basis of respect for each other's independence,
sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit." Some days later, the Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry formulated these and related ideas as a code of conduct that
would govern Vietnam's relations with other Southeast Asian states. The
emphasis was on "good neighbourly relations," "economic co-operation" and
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"co-operation among countries in the region for the building of prosperity
in keeping with each country's specific conditions."
Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien toured Southeast Asia shortly after
the "code" was formulated. As a result of his Kissinger-like exertions
Vietnam has established relations with all five ASEAN countries. Trade
agreements have been signed with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Indonesia. Vietnam has sought Malaysian assistance in rubber and palm oil
research. It is also negotiating long-term credit frciii Singapore to finance
trade with that country. Last month, Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos signed a
joint communique agreeing in principle to reactivate the Mekong Delta project.
Vietnam is a communist state, and will remain so in the foreseeable
future. But it has shown both a sense of flexibility, and a remarkable lack
of bitterness, in its external relations. Less than a year after reunification,
it has demonstrated its desire to accept assistance and friendship frcm wherever
these might come. It will undoubtedly react sharply to any perceived threat -
external or internal - against its security and integrity. Political and
military security are as much a part of national interests as economic reconstruc-
tion. Countries that live in the shadow of Vietnam will continue to be
harrassed by insurgency, until the causes of insurgency are removed. If these
countries are able to keep domestic and external issues separate, to be
realistic, flexible and innovative in dealing with a country that is sti1l
something of an "unknown" to them, they may find a willing and useful partner
in the adventures of nation building that still lie ahead - and, who knows,
in the search for the peace and stability that have eluded Southeast Asia
***********
